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ALLOCATION OF LIABILITY TO
UNCOMPENSATED LANDOWNERS FOR DAMAGES
ARISING IN THE INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM
Traditionally, highway construction and maintenance have been regarded
as functions of the state rather than the federal government.' States are
said to have ownership and plenary control over all public ways, including
sections of interstate highways, within their borders.2 Despite the increasing
influence exercised in recent years by the federal government, principally
through federal-aid programs, courts have retained the view that these
functions form an area of state competence:
Certain of our highways are built and maintained in part out of funds
contributed by the Federal government. They form links in an inter-
state system and are designated as U.S. highways. They are, nonethe-
less, State highways under the supervision and control of . . . [state
agencies] .'
In 1956 the role of the federal government in highway construction was
greatly expanded by the Federal-Aid Highway Act.4 Its provision for
federal contributions up to ninety per cent of the cost of interstate highways'
requires reevaluation of the traditional view of highway development as a
state function. This statute raises the problem whether liability for mone-
1. Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938) ; Atkins v. Kansas, 191
U.S. 207, 222 (1903); Villages of Eden & Hazelton v. Board of Highway Directors, 83
Idaho 554, 564, 367 P.2d 294, 300 (1961); Batcheller v. Highway Comm'n, 251 Iowa
364, 368, 101 N.W.2d 30, 33 (1960); State v. Maas & Waldstein Co., 83 N.J. Super. 211,
218, 199 A.2d 248, 251 (Super. Ct. 1964).
2. Maurer v. Boardman, 336 Pa. 17, 22-23, 7 A.2d 466, 471 (1939), aff'd sub nor.
Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940); Hurley v. City of Rapid City, 121 N.W.2d
21, 24 (S.D. 1963).
3. Yost v. Hall, 233 N.C. 463, 468, 64 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1951); accord, Mahler v.
United States, 306 F.2d 713, 716 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 923 (1962); State v.
George F. Lang Co., 191 A.2d 322 (Del. 1963). Several cases have held that state or
local agencies do not delegate the functions of highway location, construction and
maintenance-which are the traditional functions of the states-to the federal govern-
ment when they choose to comply, in order to receive federal aid, with federal regula-
tions concerning highway projects: Sibley v. Volusia County, 147 Fla. 256, 2 So. 2d 578
(1941); Logan v. Matthews, 330 Mo. 1213, 52 S.W.2d 989 (1932); City of Lakewood v.
Thormeyer, 171 Ohio St. 135, 168 N.E.2d 289 (1960); Eargle v. Richland County
Permanent Roads Comm'n, 123 S.C. 368, 116 S.E. 445 (1923); Bogue v. Clay County,
75 S.D. 140, 60 N.W.2d 218 (1953); Futch v. Greer, 353 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963); Highway Conm'n v. Humphreys, 58
S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Singletary v. Heathman, 300 S.W. 242, 246
(Tex. Civ. App. 1927), aff'd, 12 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929).
4. 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-34 (1964).
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tary damages should be shifted to the federal government, in a variety of
actions including inverse condemnation, when land which has not been
formally condemned is damaged as the result of a federal-aid interstate
highway project. As yet, no case has shifted monetary liability in the con-
ventional situation in which the state agency works on a highway with
federal funds under some degree of federal supervision; state liability in
inverse condemnation continues to be derived from the traditional view
that highway improvement is a matter of state competence and policy.' For
example, the Arizona Supreme Court in 1958 refused to modify the con-
ventional view of state liability despite the argument that federal financing
and interest in the highway improvement causing the landowner's injury
called for a shift to federal liability.'
The availability of extensive federal aid is a powerful incentive for the
states to submit to federal supervision, and they are undoubtedly relinquish-
ing much of their former control over highway development. Although it
operates in this indirect way, federal policy has become the vital, dominant
force in highway planning and construction, and this fact challenges the
realism of the traditional view of the states' function. This note considers
two factors that provide the doctrinal basis for a retention of state liability:
(1) the traditional test for allocating liability in joint governmental public
improvements, and (2) the traditional respect for state autonomy. These
5. 23 U.S.C. § 120(c) (1964). The provision for 90% federal financing is an
innovation of the 1956 Act. The principal predecessor of this act, the Federal Highway
Act of 1921, ch. 119, § 11, 42 Stat. 212 (1921), provided that federal funds should not
exceed 50% of the cost of improvements, with the exception that certain western states
containing extensive unappropriated public lands could receive grants in excess of that
percentage.
The primary Congressional purpose in increasing grants-in-aid to the states was
to assure that, in the interest of national defense, an adequate interstate system of
highways is maintained. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 209 F. Supp. 483
(S.D. II. 1962), discussed in text accompanying note 30 infra; see 23 U.S.C. § 101 (b)
(1964). The highway-aid program therefore is related to other enactments pertaining to
the existence of adequate highways as a factor in national defense. See 23 U.S.C. §
210 (1964) (federal subsidizing of defense access roads); 23 U.S.C. § 311 (1964)
(highway improvements strategically important to the national defense).
6. Several state courts, without discussing whether liability could be shifted to the
federal government, have tacitly assumed that if anyone is liable to landowners for
damages resulting from work on interstate highways it is the state agency that performs
construction. E.g., State v. Hollis, 93 Ariz. 200, 379 P.2d 750 (1963); State ex Tel. De-
partment of Highways v. Keen, 354 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1960); Hurley v. City of Rapid City,
121 N.W.2d 21 (S.D. 1963); Darnall v. State, 108 N.W.2d 201 (S.D. 1961).
7. State v. Leeson, 84 Ariz. 44, 323 P.2d 692 (1958), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 14 & 25 infra; cf. Mahler v. United States, 306 F.2d 713 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 923 (1962) (action for personal injuries resulting from highway
construction under pre-1956 federal-aid program).
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factors will be viewed against the presence of a national purpose to achieve
an adequate interstate highway system, a purpose which may permit the
shifting of liability to the federal government. Conceptual problems that
would be encountered if a shift were attempted will be briefly treated, and
finally, the note will consider the differences in practice that would result
from a shift to federal liability.
I. THE TRADITIONAL TEST FOR ALLOCATION OF LIABILITY IN
JOINT IMPROVEMENTS: PARTICIPATION IN CONSTRUCTION
The problem of which governmental unit jointly participating in a public
improvement should be liable for monetary damages to uncompensated
landowners has arisen in various contexts. In the cases considering this
problem, the claimed damage usually can be traced to construction, and
the courts either expressly or impliedly have focused on this phase of the
improvement-rather than planning or preparations--as the cause of
8. Cases in which the owner is unable at the time he files suit to causally relate his
damage to construction are unlikely to present an issue of liability allocation between the
state and federal governments. In most of these cases the land in question is physically
situated close enough to the improvement that the commencement or completion of
construction will bring about the damaging circumstances; and the inability of the land-
owner arises simply because he has failed to wait for construction to begin before filing
suit. One reason why such cases are unlikely to raise an issue of allocation of monetary
liability is that the owner filing suit before construction often seeks a non-monetary
remedy. Note, 1962 WAsH. U.L.Q. 210-23 reviews the remedies of injunction and
mandamus. The theory of these actions is that the defendant has failed to formally
condemn plantiff's land when the circumstances were such that it should have been
condemned. The effect of the former remedy is to restrain further progress on the project
until the plaintiff is compensated, and the latter compels officials to institute condemna-
tion proceedings. There are, however, actions for money relief available to the owner
suing before construction, and with respect to these, there is a possibility that an issue of
monetary liability allocation between the state and federal governments could arise. See
Note, supra, at 230-42 for a review of these actions, chief of which is the action in inverse
condemnation in which the owner theoretically recovers what would have been awarded if
a condemnation proceeding had been brought.
The importance and frequency of these pre-construction actions is reduced by one
fact: most land, to which damage is certain enough to be compensable in a condemna-
tion proceeding, will in fact be formally condemned. See Note, supra, at 242. Uncom-
pensated owners whose damage is speculative will have to wait until the commencement
of construction enables them to demonstrate their right to monetary damages; at that
time they can causally relate their damage to construction. In an often-cited California
case the court said:
The damage sustained by the plaintiffs was caused by the actual grading of the
street, and not by the ordinance fixing the grade.... Until the physical condition
of the street was changed, their lot had received no actual damage for public use.
The enactment of the ordinance rendered it possible that the street would at some
time be reduced to that grade, but a mere paper change of grade, did not affect the
condition of the lot, or impair its use or enjoyment. Any diminution in value that
it might sustain from the mere passing of the ordinance was purely speculative, and
Washington University Open Scholarship
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damage. As a logical step they then place liability on the governmental unit
most visibly or directly engaged in the construction.' Active participation
contingent upon the time when grading should be done.... Hence, the court did
not err in refusing to permit testimony as to the damage caused by the adoption of
the ordinance. Eachus v. Los Angeles Consol. Elec. Ry., 103 Cal. 614, 621-22, 37
Pac. 750, 753 (1894).
See MANDELKER, INVERSE CONDEMNATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF PUBLIC
RispoNsIBiUiTY 1-2 (1964).
Once construction is available it is unlikely that courts would refer to some pre-
paratory or planning phase as the cause of plaintiff's damage. But because it is possible
to causally relate some kinds of damage to either planning or construction, a knotty
problem of allocating liability could be presented if the state performed one of these
functions and the federal government the other. For example, an owner's loss of access
might be related to the location decision made by one government or it might be re-
lated to omission to build an underpass by the other government which performs the
construction. However, the courts are likely to disregard the former conceptualiza-
tion of cause, because the idea of overt governmental activity which physically affects the
land is engrained in the theories of recovery to which the courts are accustomed. See
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946). MANDELKER op. Cit. supra, at 4-10
reviews three conceptual backbones for the variety of actions grouped under the term "in-
verse condemnation": (1) the property right approach, (2) the tort approach and (3)
the eminent domain background. The first category revolves around some physical occur-
rence such as flooding (bringing into play doctrines drawn from water law) or slides and
encroachments (which make relevant the doctrines of property law concerning the obliga-
tion of lateral support between private landowners). Id. at 4-5. Tort analysis is predi-
cated upon physical occurrences such as have traditionally formed the basis for recovery
in trespass, negligence or nuisance. Id. at 6-7. The extension of eminent domain concepts
has resulted from increased recognition that damage arising from construction may be
tantamount to a physical entry and "taking" by the sovereign. Id. at 9-10.
There is a possibility that uncompensated landowners could not causally relate their
damages to construction, even if it had been commenced at the time of filing suit. In
Logan v. Matthews, 330 Mo. 1213, 52 S.W.2d 989 (1932), taxpaying residents of a
town sought to enjoin the state highway commission from relocating a highway around
their town. If they had proceeded on a theory of damage to their land, such as deple-
tion of value, they could not have related their damage to anything except the choice of
location. However, it is unlikely that governmental liability could be predicated upon
decisions that have non-physical consequences this remote (see Darnall v. State, 108
N.W.2d 201, 205 (S.D. 1961)) and, in fact, the plaintiffs in Logan made no such claim
but rather alleged that the commission lacked statutory authority to make the relocation
decision.
9. In Cooper v. City of Bogalusa, 195 La. 1097, 198 So. 510 (1940), the state was
relieved of liability for damages resulting from a flood control project. The court
articulated the step from causation to allocation of liability: "If plaintiff has suffered
damage, then the active and only agency causing the damage is the United States
government." Id. at 1103, 198 So. at 512. In Central N.Y. Broadcasting Corp. v.
State, 3 App. Div. 2d 128, 158 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1957), a landowner sued the state for
erosion damage to his land resulting from a flood control project on which the federal
government had done the actual construction work. The court, employing an analysis
sounding in negligence, searched the record for a causal connection between the damage
and some negligent act or omission on the part of the state. Finding none, the court re-
leased the state from liability. This same sort of causation reasoning is manifested in
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1965/iss2/5
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in construction appears to be the pivotal factor in allocation of liability
in joint flood control projects and maintenance of navigable streams."0 Two
California cases illustrate. In Cory v. City of Stockton" the state was re-
lieved of liability when its participation was limited to acquisition of all
rights-of-way for the project, and the federal government was responsible
for actual construction. In Clement v. State Reclamation Bd." the state
and federal governments were held jointly liable when, in addition to pro-
viding the rights-of-way, the state actively joined the federal government in
construction. 3
These cases reveal a judicial predilection to hold liable the government
whose agents actually were doing the work that caused damage to land. Be-
cause state agencies typically perform the actual construction of federal-aid
highways, this tendency is one explanation for the result reached by courts
that have continued to uphold state liability. This observation is based
Owens v. Highway Dep't, 239 S.C. 44, 121 S.E.2d 240 (1961), discussed in text
accompanying note 15 infra; see City of Wichita Falls v. Real Estate Trust, 135 S.W.2d
736 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
10. In Vuijan v. Board of Comm'rs, 170 So. 2d 910 (La. Ct. App. 1965), the owner
of an oyster bed sued for damages allegedly resulting from the dredging of a channel in
the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet. State participation was limited to furnishing all
lands, servitudes and rights-of-way incident to the construction and maintenance of the
project, and to indemnify and hold harmless the United States against all claims that
might result. The Army Corps of Engineers performed the actual work on the project,
which fact led the court to call this a "federal project" for which the state could not be
liable. Id. at 912; accord, Haeuser v. Board of Comm'rs, 170 So. 2d 728 (La. Ct. App.
1965); Cooper v. City of Bogalusa, supra note 9; Central N.Y. Broadcasting Co. v.
State, supra note 9; see Tilden v. United States, 10 F. Supp. 377 (W.D. La. 1934); cf.
General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U.S. 159 (1956). But see Danziger v. United
States, 93 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. La. 1950); Demoski v. State, 12 Misc. 2d 416, 168 N.Y.S.2d
242 (Ct. Cl. 1957); cf. Stewart v. Sullivan County, 196 Tenn. 49, 264 S.W.2d 217
(1953).
11. 90 Cal. App. 634, 266 Pac. 552 (Dist. Ct. App. 1928).
12. 35 Cal. 2d 628, 220 P.2d 897 (1950). The court rejected dictum from Branden-
burg v. Los Angeles County Flood Dist., 45 Cal. App. 2d 306, 114 P.2d 14 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1941) to the effect that any federal participation relieved the state of liability.
13. An active role in construction appears to have been a prime factor in the alloca-
tion of liability in joint municipal-federal projects undertaken during the depression
years. Morgan v. City of Logan, 125 W. Va. 445, 24 S.E.2d 760 (1943) (city liable for
active operational role of providing trucks and drivers for hauling materials); see City of
Houston v. Anderson, 115 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (city liable). Municipal
liability for blasting damage was denied, however, in Perry County v. Tyree, 282 Ky.,
708, 709, 139 S.W.2d 721 (1940), because:
The proof introduced at the trial failed to show that either the City or the County
planned or supervised the work, or engaged or directed any of the workmen. On
the contrary, the project was planned and financed by the Works Progress Adminis-
tration, whose agents and employees were in complete charge of the operation.
See Heimann v. City of Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d 747, 756, 185 P.2d 597, 603 (1947).
See also Annot., 136 A.L.R. 525 (1942).
Washington University Open Scholarship
ALLOCATION OF HIGHWAY LIABILITY
partly on inference because the allocation of liability between state and
federal governments has been infrequently acknowledged as a problem with
regard to highway improvements (this is probably because the traditional
view of state function has been entrenched so strongly that it has not often
occurred to anyone that liability might be shifted to the federal govern-
ment). Cases considering the problem have, however, established an opera-
tive distinction between an active role by federal employees or agents in
construction on the one hand and behind-the-scenes federal involvement in
financing, planning and supervision on the other. The Arizona Supreme
Court upheld state liability in inverse condemnation, principally on the
basis of this distinction, in State v. Leeson. 4 The federal government,
possessing a special interest in improving access roads to military reserva-
tions, effectively supervised the improvement since its approval of state
proposals was a condition precedent to the granting of a federal subsidy
(which covered almost the entire cost of the project). Nevertheless, state
responsibility for construction was held determinative. The opposite result
obtained in the South Carolina case of Owens v. Highway Dep't,5 in which
the state highway department was relieved of liability in inverse condemna-
14. 84 Ariz. 44, 323 P.2d 692 (1958), discussed in text accompanying note 25 infra;
accord, Public Water Supply Dist. v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Mo. 1946);
cf. Mahler v. United States, 306 F.2d 713 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 923 (1962)
(action for personal injuries resulting from highway construction). In the Water Supply
Dist. case the federal government was interested in widening a highway owned by the
state of Missouri so as to provide better access to a war plant. Accordingly, the federal
government acquired the land necessary for the improvement and then entered into an
agreement with the state whereby the state was responsible for actual construction which
was to be subsidized by federal funds. The private contractor performing the construc-
tion damaged the pipelines of the water district, which thereafter was made a party to the
condemnation action and filed the claim in question against the United States. The
district's theory was that the contractor had a contract with the federal government in
the performance of which he did what amounted to a "taking" of plaintiff's property.
The court rejected the contention that the United States had been in privity with the
contractor, stating that the project was "an undertaking of the Highway Commission of
Missouri, and not an undertaking of the United States Government." 66 F. Supp. at 70.
The only undertaking of the federal government was to provide funds for the improve-
ment.
Under the scheme by which the United States Government is shown to have
participated in question, it is apparent that the United States Government was only
seeking a "means" whereby commerce and defense workers could reach one of its
defense plants. The United States Government did not, as a primary obligation,
undertake to establish such "means." The road which was . . . [improved]
that provided such "means" belonged to the state of Missouri. ... The highway
Commission of said state prepared the plans and specifications for the project in
question and undertook the direct work of constructing said road. Under such
circumstances it cannot be contended that any damage resulted to plaintiff by
reason of any act or thing that was done, by any person in the work of construct-
ing said road who had a contract with, or acted on behalf of the United States.
Id. at 71.
15. 239 S.C. 44, 121 S.E.2d 240 (1961).
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tion for damages resulting from a highway relocation necessitated by ex-
tension of runways at a military base. However, in this case the state high-
way department's participation was limited to surveying the relocation
route; the Army Corps of Engineers drafted the specifications for construc-
tion and contracted for a private firm to do the work. In addition, the
contractor, who was paid by the Department of Defense, was supervised by
one Army engineer who was present on the job. The court noted that the
action was to recover damages for a "taking" (water damage to plaintiff's
land) which had resulted from the manner in which the construction was
carried out. It held that the state agency could not be held to have "taken"
since it had not engaged in the construction of the highway.
Against this background, the statement in the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway
Act that "construction of any highways or portions of highways located on
a Federal-aid system shall be undertaken by the respective state highway de-
partments or under their direct supervision,"' becomes a significant impedi-
ment to any shift towards federal liability. Nevertheless, the position that
liability attaches solely to the state because it performs construction fails to
recognize that federal policy increasingly controls the detail, direction and
manner in which construction operations are conducted. Once recognized,
this fact makes possible the assertion that the federal government, by con-
trolling state activity, does the "taking" of land which is damaged by inter-
state highway development. As the effectiveness of state policy as an
initiating and directing force wanes in favor of federal influence, state
activity becomes an unsatisfactory foundation upon which to support a
theory of liability. The following section, however, discusses impediments to
the success of this argument.
II. STATE AUTONOMY AS A FACTOR IN STATE LIABILITY
A second factor in the traditional result of state liability is the respect
Congress and the courts exhibit for state autonomy. To preserve state
autonomy Congress has tended to pursue its policies through indirect
channels, i.e., to induce state action in directions that achieve national
policies. Courts have deferred to this Congressional tendency, which
placates those who assert that federal power is growing at an alarming rate;
indirect action by Congress appears less threatening than direct preemption.
The concept of state autonomy embodied in the tenth amendment is also
influential in judicial characterizations of the federal-state relationship
concerning national policies as one of contract between principals, into
which the states have entered voluntarily."' This position expresses the
16. 23 U.S.C. § 114 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
17. The framework of this concept of federal-state relations was largely established by
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currently prevailing view of federal-state relations in the context of interstate
highway development;"8 the states are said to enter as contracting principals
the Supreme Court's discussion of Congressional taxing power in two famous cases. In
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) the Court struck down national legislation
concerning agricultural adjustment and thereby placed limits upon the power of Con-
gress to authorize expenditure of public funds to indirectly accomplish some policy per-
taining to the general welfare. The Court held that Congress could not utilize the power
given it by the Constitution to tax and spend as an "instrument to enforce a regulation of
matters of state concern." Id. at 70. The Court's view of a burgeoning of federal power
is expressed in the words: "The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the
power to coerce or destroy." Id. at 71.
The coercion argument was next raised in Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548 (1937): "The assailants of the [federal] statute say that its dominant end and
aim is to drive the state legislature under the whip of economic pressure into the
enactment of unemployment compensation laws at the bidding of the central govern-
ment." Id. at 587. However, the Court, endeavoring to draw a distinction between duress
and inducement (Id. at 586), rejected this argument and upheld the Social Security Act:
Even sovereigns may contract without derogating from their sovereignty.... The
states are at liberty, upon obtaining the consent of Congress, to make agreements
with one another ... We find no room for doubt that they may do the like with
Congress if the essence of their statehood is maintained without impairment.
Alabama is seeking and obtaining a credit of millions in favor of her citizens out
of the Treasury of the nation. Nowhere in our scheme of government . . . do we
find that she is prohibited from assenting to conditions that will assure a fair andjust requital for benefits received. Id. at 597-98.
18. See HIGHWAY RESEARCH BD., SPECIAL REP'T 21, RELOCATION OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES DUE TO HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENT 35 (1955):
As discussed above, the federal-aid highway program is a voluntary one, in which
the States participate under their own initiative. Highway projects are initiated,
controlled, and executed by the States, the Federal authorities possess merely a veto
power in the use of Federal funds on such projects. The States are not forced
to undertake any highway improvement program; any highway project they do
undertake may be financed exclusively with State funds and would not come within
the scope of Federal highway aid. The only sanction invoked for noncompliance
with the standards of construction on Federal-aid projects is the withdrawal of
Federal-aid from such a project.
The position that an offer of Federal-aid in return for compliance with approved
standards represents an unconstitutional coercion on the states to adopt such
standards and an unconstitutional attempt to regulate activities not within the
power of Congress, has been judicially rejected by the Supreme Court in cases
involving Federal programs of unemployment insurance, inheritance taxes, and
maternity relief. The same principles would seem to be applicable in the case of
the highway program. The legislative history of the Federal-aid system and of
roads constructed under the National Industrial Recovery Act also support this
conclusion. (Footnotes omitted.)
Congress was careful to stipulate that states are under no compulsion to participate in
the aid program: "any state desiring to avail itself of the benefits of this chapter shall
submit to the Secretary for his approval a program or programs of proposed projects for
the utilization of the funds apportioned." 23 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1964); and further:
The committee emphasizes that the program authorized herein is not one by which
the Federal Government will construct highways. . . . [It willi retain the basic
structure of existing law without disturbing the present relationship between the
Bureau of Public Roads and the States, nor the rights of the States in planning
their programs and laying out the location of their highways. S. REP. No. 1965,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1956).
In City of Lakewood v. Thormeyer, 171 Ohio St. 135, 168 N.E.2d 289 (1960), the
court rejected a contention that state legislative power to designate highways to be im-
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and not agents into arrangements by which they act primarily in their own
interest but incidentally also promote the national interest. 19 If the states
act voluntarily and primarily for their own benefit, it follows that they
should correspondingly bear significant financial burdens. If valid, this
verbalization of state interest is a strong support for continued state liability
to uncompensated landowners. The following section questions whether
this idea is realistic.
III. NATIONAL PURPOSE
In 1962 the Supreme Court in Griggs v. County of Allegheny20
reiterated the conventional position on federal-state participation in federally
assisted programs. The case contains, however, a dissenting opinion by
Mr. Justice Black which is the first significant rejection of this position as it
relates to liability allocation. The Court found, and the dissent agreed, that
by constitutional standards the noise and harassment caused by the landing
and taking off of aircraft constituted a "taking" of land located near an
airport. Black's position was that the federal government, rather than the
local governmental unit held liable by the majority, owed just compensation.
The county had taken the initiative for planning, locating, and construct-
proved or constructed had been abdicated in favor of the federal government when the
state participated in the federal-aid program. The court noted the federal government's
program is contingent upon a state decision to improve, and that after such a decision the
only power of the Secretary of Commerce is to approve or veto. "It still remains
with . . . [state officials] to say in the end what highways, if any, can belong to the
federal system." Id. at 145, 168 N.E.2d at 297.
Two cases, although they were decided before passage of the 1956 Act, express
authoritative opinions about the federal-state relationship concerning the exercise of state
police power to require relocation of utility facilities in the way of federal-aid highway
projects. In Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 266 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1954), Southern Bell
contended that the states were acting as agents of federal policy in constructing federal-
aid highways, and that since a state cannot exercise its police power in favor of another
sovereignty the state could not force a relocation. The court rejected this argument,
stating that federal-aid legislation has not only failed to make agents out of the states
but also was not intended to displace the conventional state functions of highway
development and maintenance. Id. at 311. The same argument was rejected (on the
Kentucky holding) in Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State ex tel. Ervin, 75 So. 2d
796, 800 (Fla. 1954). But see Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405
(1935), discussed infra note 33.
19. See Public Water Supply Dist. v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Mo. 1946),
discussed supra note 14. In State v. George F. Lang Co., 191 A.2d 322 (Del. 1963), the
court held that the state could validly exercise its own power of eminent domain to
acquire land for a federal-aid highway project, because the state has an interest in ade-
quate highways which exists concurrently with the national interest to maintain an
interstate sytem for national defense. Accord, State v. Leeson, 84 Ariz. 44, 323 P.2d
692 (1958), discussed in text accompanying note 25 infra.
20. 369 U.S. 84 (1962); accord, Alfonso v. Hillsborough County, 308 F.2d 724, 726
(5th Cir. 1962).
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ing the airport. This work was done subject to the approval of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration, and the project was financed in large part by
federal funds made available for the purpose of inducing local units to
establish airports. The role of the county was analogous to that of the states
in the highway-aid program, and the majority holding fortifies the tradi-
tional doctrine that the states, voluntarily participating as autonomous
entities in that program, should be liable when construction causes a
"taking" of private property.
The dissent, however, pierced the veil of ostensible initiative on the part of
the county and stated that the county should not be liable because the
"taking" had been done by the federal government pursuant to a national
purpose: "The planes that take off and land at the Greater Pittsburgh
Airport wind their rapid way through space not for the peculiar benefit of
the citizens of Allegheny County but as part of a great, reliable transporta-
tion system of immense advantage to the whole Nation in time of peace and
war." 2' To support his view that the federal government had done the
"taking," Mr. Justice Black pointed to three factors. First, Congressional
fiat had already declared all airspace for takeoffs and landing, as well as for
flight, to be navigable airspace within the public domain. This declaration
was a first step in enacting a comprehensive plan for regulating every aspect
of air transit. Second, the opinion emphasized the degree of federal control
exercised over the airspace: "These airspaces are so much under the control
of the Federal Government that every takeoff from and every landing... is
made under the direct signal and supervisory control of some federal
agent. '2 2 Black concluded by emphasizing the national purpose Congress
sought to implement by federal financing: "The construction . ..was
financed in large part by funds supplied by the United States as part of its
plan to induce localities.., to assist in setting up a national... air-trans-
portation system."2
3
Mr. Justice Black's position is potentially applicable to the question of
liability allocation under the federal-aid highway program, especially since
the 1956 Act contains the following expression of national purpose:
It is hereby declared to be in the national interest to accelerate the
construction of the Federal-aid highway systems, including the Na-
tional System of Interstate and Defense Highways, since many of such
highways, or portions thereof, are in fact inadequate to meet the needs
of local and interstate commerce, for the national and civil defense.
21. 369 U.S. at 94 (dissenting opinion); see Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters,
294 U.S. 405, 424 (1935), discussed infra note 33. But see note 26 infra and accom-
panying text.
22. 369 U.S. at 92-93.
23. Id. at 94.
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It is hereby declared that the prompt and early completion of the
National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, so named be-
cause of its primary importance to the national defense..., is essential
to the national interest and is one of the most important objectives of
this Act.24
At present, no court has considered Mr. Justice Black's argument in con-
nection with a possible shift to federal liability under the 1956 Act. The case
most nearly in point, however, rejected an analogous argument which
asserted that a state should be relieved of liability for damages resulting
from improvement of a military access road. In the 1958 Arizona case of
State v. Leeson2" it was contended that the federal interest in such roads-
evidenced by almost total federal financing of the project-made federal
policy such a dominant force that the state, in carrying out construction,
was a mere agent or "middleman." This contention was rejected in an
opinion which adopted the conventional view that a state has its own vital
interests motivating it to participate voluntarily as a contracting principal;
in this case the state interest was said to be that of sharing in the national
defense.
Notice, however, a departure in this case from the usual situation in
which a contract analysis is utilized. Rather than acting primarily to
immediately serve its own interests and only incidentally to further the
national purpose, the state here acted primarily in furtherance of the na-
tional purpose of maintaining an adequate national defense, which would
not benefit the state until accomplished on a national scale and then only as
an incident to the protection of all the states. The contract analogy is less
applicable in this case because what the state was doing is incompatible with
a view that a unique set of interests relating only to the state's governmental
competence, existing within a certain geographical area, motivated the
state to participate. This observation about the Leeson case does not, how-
ever, necessarily preclude application of the state interest analysis to a high-
24. 23 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1964), quoted in City of Carrollton v. Walker, 215 Ga.
505, 511, 111 S.E.2d 79, 83 (1959). In City of Lakewood v. Thormeyer, 171 Ohio St.
135, 168 N.E.2d 289 (1960), discussed supra note 18, the court said:
The lessons of World War II, the changing international picture since then, and
the unexpected population increase in this state and nation, together with the
attendant increase in motor-vehicle registration, have presented transportation
problems undreamed of 25 years ago. The national concern is evidenced by the
multibiffion-dollar aid program authorized by the Federal Aid Highway Act. Most
certainly, national defense was a prime consideration in this program.... Naturally
the route and design of a relocated facility on an f. a. p. highway or the designation
of an f. a. p. highway is of concern and subject to the approval of both the Director
of Highways and the federal authority. Id. at 147, 168 N.E.2d at 298.
25. 84 Ariz. 44, 323 P.2d 692 (1958), discussed in text accompanying note 14 supra;
see Public Water Supply Dist. v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Mo. 1946),
discussed supra note 14.
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way improvement under the 1956 Act. A state can envision that the exis-
tence of an improved interstate highway system within its borders will pro-
duce benefits such as the alleviation of traffic congestion and a boost to its
economy. These are matters of state concern, and they form a set of interests
which exists concurrently with the national interest.
Mr. Justice Black's position nevertheless raises the question whether there
is a primacy of national purpose in the interstate highway program which
so overshadows the state interest that it makes the idea of contracting prin-
cipals unrealistic. This observation raises the further question of what sense
"primacy" is used here. It cannot mean that the set of state interests are
not sufficiently important to the state that it would not, in the absence
of a federal-aid program, undertake the financing of a highway program
in which it would have to accept liability to uncompensated landowners.
Thus, the benefits of federal-aid for highway development do not necessarily
accrue to the states as a mere incident to the attainment of a national pur-
pose. -8 In fact, it is possible to assert that the benefits accruing to a state
are, relatively speaking, as important to the population of the state as are
those that accrue to the nation. Thus, the Leeson statement of state interest
effectively counters any attempt such as that made by Black to quantita-
tively or qualitatively compare the importance of the national and state in-
terests in highway development and thereby show that a state is not acting
primarily in its own behalf.
The idea of primacy of national interests, however, can be conceived in
another way which more effectively undermines the conventional view of
26. The Leeson argument is an effective counter to Mr. Justice Black's opinion in
Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 94 (1962), quoted in text accompanying
note 21 supra, that liability should be shifted because the primary purpose behind the
operation of airports is national in scope. The argument points out what Black arguably
overlooked: that the locality may have an interest which exists concurrently with the
federal interest and which, although not as wide in scope, may be intensive enough in the
geographical area within which it exists to support local liability. The Leeson argument
gains support from authoritative expressions on issues other than federal-state liability
allocation. See State v. George F. Lang Co., 191 A.2d 322 (Del. 1963), discussed
supra note 19. HIGHWAY RESEARCH BD., SPECIAL REP'T 21, RELOCATION OF PUBLIC
UT.LITIES DUE TO HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENT 33 (1955), rejects as untenable the position
that the highway-aid program is designed solely for national rather than local benefit and
that therefore the states cannot exercise their police power to require utilities to relocate
their facilities when they obstruct a federal-aid project. The rejection is based upon
what is called the obvious truth that localities almost inevitably benefit when nearby
highways are improved because of the alleviation of such problems as traffic congestion
and because of the boost better transportation facilities gives to commerce and the
standard of living. From this perspective, it becomes almost irrelevant for purposes of
liability allocation that the Congressional design was national in scope, because both the
nation and the locality derive benefits which may be relatively as important to one as to
the other.
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principals contracting to further their own interests. This argument is that
the development of interstate highways is essentially the function of the
federal government. Rejection of the position that highway development is
a state function is accomplished by asserting that the national purpose has
become the dominant motivating and directing force behind highway
development, and that Congress is determined to fulfill, one way or the
other, this national purpose. The federal government is willing to defer as
much as possible to the idea of state autonomy by maintaining a scheme of
ostensible state initiative which appears to revolve around a set of state
interests and policies. But realistically viewed, the federal-aid highway
program contains machinery which enables the federal government to
accomplish its goals with or without state cooperation. Under this view it is
acknowledged that the states are induced to participate by appeals to their
interests; but the federal-state relationship is not viewed from the perspective
of the states' purpose in entering that relationship. Rather, the starting
point of this approach is the contemplation of Congress that the states
should be allowed, at the grace of the federal government, the privilege of
assisting only as long as they function satisfactorily.
It is unrealistic to call this a contract relationship between principals when
one party has so much leverage over the other, both in regard to the terms
of the arrangement and the power to accomplish its purpose with or without
the participation of the other. This view is supported by cases in which
courts have dealt with aspects of federal-state relations which-unlike the
question of liability allocation-directly and immediately threaten the ful-
fillment of the national purpose of the 1956 Act. The issue in these cases
arises when a state is unable to condemn land for a section of the Interstate
System because of state law or cannot do so with sufficient promptness, and
it requests the federal government to condemn under section 107 of the
act." In United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Knox County" ' a
federal district court upheld section 107 against a contention that the
federal government could not constitutionally do for the state what the
state lacked the power to do for itself. The court stated that the provision
was not intended to aid the states in carrying out state projects but author-
ized the federal government to exercise its own power of eminent domain to
accomplish the national purpose of acquiring lands for the Interstate
System.2" It follows from the court's reasoning-although the issue pre-
27. 23 U.S.C. § 107 (1964).
28. 175 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Tenn. 1959).
29. We must conclude that state policy with reference to cemeteries, whatever it
may be, is not controlling. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 makes it
clear that these lands are being taken for highways to be used in the national
defense. The authority of the Federal Government to condemn for that pur-
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sented did not require the court to go this far-that the Interstate sections
are actually constructed pursuant to a national purpose. From this perspec-
tive, it is arguably unrealistic to assert that construction-the traditional
touchstone for liability-remains essentially a state function.
In United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Peoria County"0 another
federal district court rejected an analogous contention of federal inability to
condemn because of the state's disability to proceed under state laws. The
argument was that because the agency designated by the state legislature to
guide the participation of the state in the federal-aid program could not
under Illinois law condemn land which had already been devoted to a
public use (in this case, a cemetery), the agency had no authority to circum-
vent its disability by requesting federal condemnation. The foundation for
the court's holding was its recognition of Congressional intent that the na-
tional purpose should be implemented, only to a limited extent, by state
right-of-way acquisitions. When state implementation becomes impracti-
cable, the act "holds in reserve the federal power of eminent domain" to
carry out the federal policy.31 The court interpreted Congressional intent to
be that "accomplishment of the construction of the nation-wide system
should not be thwarted by the inability of the several states to obtain the
necessary rights-of-way."3 - After making these policy observations, the court
held that:
[T]he authority of the ... [state agency] to make the request which
invoked the federal power must be inherent in the Illinois statute. The
interstate system is essentially a federal project. Had Illinois chosen to
not participate in the project, the power of the United States to route
FAI 74 over the proposed right-of-way through Illinois and over the
land in suit cannot be questioned. Illinois did choose to participate ....
Illinois, having elected to participate... and having designated the...
agency authorized to act in her name, may not invoke the laws of the
State to deny to her designated agent the authority to do every act
necessary to the furtherance of the federal program. 3
pose is unquestioned. Since a national interest is involved, it is immaterial
whether the Federal Government utilizes its own power of condemnation or
that of the State. Id. at 423.
30. 209 F. Supp. 483 (S.D. Ill. 1962), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Pleasure
Driveway & Park Dist., 314 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
31. Id. at 489.
32. Ibid.
33. Id. at 490. (Emphasis added.) Eden Memorial Park Ass'n v. Department of Pub.
Works, 59 Cal. 2d 412, 380 P.2d 390, 29 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1963), held that the State
Highway Engineer had been properly authorized by the state legislature to make a request
for federal acquisition under section 107. The court stated:
In seeking a reasonable balance between local and national needs with respect
to the Interstate System section 107 does not put generally applicable local policies
governing condemnation ahead of the needs of the Interstate System .... It does,
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The language of these federal cases challenges the realism of retaining
the conventional position that the state and federal governments participate
as contracting principals in all joint highway projects. In effect, the courts
indicated that the availability as well as the employment of the federal
power to condemn evidences the essentially federal character of the project,
which, in an appropriate case, could form the basis of an assertion by an
uncompensated landowner that the federal government has done the
"taking." However, these cases involved projects in which the state ina-
bility to condemn immediately blocked development of the Interstate
System; courts not faced with such an impending threat have not displayed
comparable impatience with the conventional position of state autonomy.
Since the issue of liability allocation poses no immediate threat, it is
questionable whether courts would bring national purpose so strongly to
bear upon that issue.
IV. CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN A SHIFT TO FEDERAL LIABILITY
Basically, the theory developed in this note is that liability should be im-
posed upon that government whose interest makes it the preeminent force
however, protect local interests by requiring that the state request any action by the
Secretary [of Commerce] pursuant to its terms. Id. at 418, 380 P.2d at 394, 29 Cal.
Rptr. at 794.
The argument that construction of the Interstate System is essentially a federal under-
taking gains limited support from Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405
(1935), reversing Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Baker, 167 Tenn. 470, 71 S.W.2d 678
(1934). In this case the state court had upheld the constitutionality of a statute provid-
ing for contribution by railroads when the presence of their facilities necessitated
construction of an underpass to enable a highway improvement to go through. The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded because the state court, under the impression that
a statute valid when enacted could not be invalidated by a change in the circumstances
in which it is administered, refused to consider several arguments raised by the railroad
to the effect that the statute had been invalidated because its administration under the
then current conditions amounted to an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the
state's police power. The Supreme Court opinion offers no direct holding on these
arguments, but it lends tacit assent to them because it states that the court should have at
least considered and possibly could have adopted the arguments. One of these arguments
had been adopted by the trial court (which had been reversed by the state supreme
court); it stated that the building of the underpass to which the railroad was expected to
contribute was "part of a state-wide and nation-wide plan to foster commerce . . . and
that the decision to build this underpass, its location and construction, was not in any
proper sense an exercise of the police power, but rather . . . [was] pursuant to a general
plan of internal improvement fostered by the Congress of the United States in conjunc-
tion with the several States to make a nation-wide sytem of super-highways .... " Id. at
416. The Supreme Court added that the state court might have found that the building
of adequate facilities for such purposes as carrying the mails and national defense was
included in this national purpose, and that the national purpose had, since the passage of
the statute, made the federal government rather than the state the primary builder of
roads, which change of conditions could have been found to invalidate the statute. Id. at
416-19.
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behind a highway project; the courts should put aside the rhetoric of state
autonomy and ostensible state responsibility for construction and inquire
whether federal policy, operating behind the scenes to achieve a national
purpose, is such a force. However, because there is probably insufficient
federal influence to justify a shift to federal liability in every federal-aid
project, there is a need for criteria to define the proper spheres of liability.
This need makes it necessary to formulate more precisely the theory of
federal liability.
A. The Federal Government Causing Damage to Land
Liability has been allocated traditionally on the theory that the govern-
ment performing construction causes damage to land and should therefore
be liable. A shift to federal liability would not necessarily depart from this
analysis if the courts were able to visualize that the federal government is,
in effect, responsible for construction. Professor Mandelker has stated that
the setting of federal standards, which states must follow if they are to
receive aid, suggests a principal-agent relationship between the state and
federal governments under which the latter might be held vicariously liable
for actions of the state agency performing construction."
The matter might also be viewed by analogy to another private law
doctrine, that of the borrowed servant. Under this view it would be
emphasized that interstate highway development is essentially a federal
undertaking in which the federal government borrows the state highway
department and its employees to carry out construction. Under this view
the state is no longer an autonomous entity participating-even as agent-
in a highway project, and the federal government is solely responsible for
acts of construction. State-paid employees would be working directly for
the federal government with the state existing as a mere conduit35 for the
payment of these employees.
These theories drawn by analogy from private law doctrines suffer from
two principal defects. First, they strike at a point where traditional views
are most entrenched; they openly conflict with the idea of state autonomy.
To expressly call the states agents of the federal government, or conduits
for effecting the national will, would be objectionable to those desiring to
maintain the status quo in federal-state relations. Second, the courts would
probably become involved in the technical issues suggested by the private
law doctrines, which issues have little to do with policy questions concern-
34. MANDELKER, INVERSE CONDEMNATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LimITs OF PUBLIC
R.zsPONsIILrry 45 (1964). The agency analysis is, of course, against the weight of
present case authority. See cases cited note 18 supra.
35. Cf. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Morton County, 131 N.W.2d 557, 565 (N.D. 1964).
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ing allocation of the financial burdens of highway development. Damage
typically results from particular operations connected with a project.
Federal standards and supervision are more influential with respect to some
of these operations than to others, and courts might be tempted to consider
arguments to the effect that the federal government should be absolved
from liability when the decisions of state officials were the predominant
initiative behind a particular operation causing damage, despite the over-
whelming federal influence behind the project in general. Courts would
be forced into a case-by-case unravelling of federal-state relations with
regard to these particulars. Thus, if the state were called the agent of the
federal government, courts might get entangled in a factual issue of
whether the state had been "authorized" to perform the activity that led to
the damage. A similar issue might arise under the borrowed servant analysis
if a court considered whether the federal government, as borrower, had
attained enough dominion and control over the servant highway depart-
ment with respect to a particular operation, and the state, as lender, had
relinquished enough control, to justify a conclusion that the federal govern-
ment should be solely liable." There is also danger that a court employing
these analogies would hold the state and federal governments concurrently
liable, which would lead, in turn, to complex case-by-case considerations
of proportioning the contributions of each.
The agency analogies could be avoided by asserting that the setting of
federal standards and specifications is the ultimate cause of the damage,
because they divert the activity of the state agency performing construction
into that which is the immediate cause." ' But this approach suffers from the
36. For discussions of issues that might arise concerning federal borrowing of state or
local employees, see McFarland v. Dixie Mach. & Equip. Co., 348 Mo. 341, 153 S.W.2d
67 (1941); Annot., 136 A.L.R. 525 (1942).
37. Professor Mandelker suggests that the federal government might be held liable
"directly on the basis of its own requirements and standards." MANDELKFR, Op. Cit. supra
note 34, at 45. The existence of federal supervision in regard to the particulars involved
in highway construction was relied upon heavily in United States v. Certain Parcels of
Land in Peoria County, 209 F. Supp. 483 (S.D. Ill. 1962), discussed in text accompany-
ing note 30 supra. Among the areas of federal control listed by the court were:
All programs of construction proposed by a State must be submitted to the
Secretary for prior approval, and the Secretary must give preference to programs
which expedite completion of the interstate system and priority to projects recom-
mended by the Secretary of Defense as important to the national defense. All
plans, specifications and estimates of construction projects must be submitted for
the approval of the Secretary, and these must meet with standards established by
the Act. All construction by a State is subject to inspection and approval by the
Secretary. Id. at 489. (Footnotes omitted.)
Many of the standards established by the 1956 Act are quite detailed. For example,
the state, in order to receive aid for construction in the Interstate System, must adopt
geometric and construction standards such as to enable the proposed project to adequately
accommodate traffic for at least a period of twenty years (section 109(a)); construction
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same two principal defects as the agency theories. First, it resembles too
closely a holding that the states are coerced by the federal government in
the manner in which they perform construction operations. Second, the
courts would again become entangled in deciding whether the state was
acting under its own initiative or was attempting to satisfy some federal
standard when it engaged in a particular operation in a particular way.
B. Allocation of Liability Based on a Pre-Set Formula:
Avoidance of Case-by-Case Determinations
This sampling of problems indicates that a shift to federal liability would
be accomplished best by wiping the slate clean of all formulae drawn by
analogy from private law. There is no need for tedious conceptualizations
in such terms as agency to enable courts to visualize-in a way that satis-
fies the mind trained in a common law tradition still dominated in large
measure by the idea of the physical event as an operative fact-a chain of
physical causation between the federal government acting through its
agents and damage to land. Even though the particular operation causing
damage occurs on a construction site miles from the nearest federal agent,
the federal government can be linked to that operation without postulating
either its physical presence or some other tangible evidence of its influence.
The link suggested here is the non-tangible one of the national purpose,
which transforms some highway development, regardless of who performs
construction, into an essentially federal undertaking by virtue of the federal
policy which is the predominant motivating and directing influence behind
the project, although an influence which cannot physically be seen on the
job.
A shift to federal liability could be accomplished by gauging the intensity
of the national interest in different kinds of highway improvements accord-
ing to predetermined rules. Rules might be formulated on the basis of the
classification of all federal-aid highways into a "secondary system," a
must ensure "all weather service and permit maintenance at a reasonable cost (section 109
(c)) ; the Secretary must approve state installation of traffic signals and various marking
signs only when it will "promote the safe and efficient utilization of the highways"
(section 109(d)) ; the Secretary's approval of safety devices at railroad crossings or draw-
bridges is a condition precedent to the granting of federal aid (section 109(e)); states
shall not allow commercial establishments to be located on the Interstate System, nor
allow additional points of access, without the prior approval of the Secretary (section
111). This latter provision could, for example, form the basis of an assertion that federal
restrictions on access, rather than state construction of an Interstate section, were the
cause of a plaintiff's loss of access. Likewise, federal specifications concerning matters
like grade could be called the cause of flood damage resulting from construction of a fill
to meet the grade requirements.
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"primary system," and an "Interstate System."" The national purpose does
not necessarily relate to each of these classifications in the same way,"' and
the courts could find that possibly the first two classifications do not involve
a sufficient national purpose to overshadow local interests. The conclusion
would be reached that federal aid is an incident to programs in which the
state is the vital party in interest; liability accordingly would remain in the
state with liability shifting to the federal government in the remaining
program.
These rules for gauging the intensity of federal involvement in different
kinds of joint projects reflect policy determinations for the allocation of the
monetary burden of landowners' actions. Administration of the rules, once
they were established, would not necessarily require a renewed discussion of
the reason for federal liability in every case;"0 it is the avoidance of such dis-
cussion as much as possible that would decrease the appearance of a threat
to the status quo in federal-state relations. The rules would be established
most successfully in the first instance by Congress; it is doubtful that
anyone would challenge legislation, not couched in terms of federal pre-
emption, that would have the effect of relieving the states of a significant
financial burden. The courts, on the other hand, even if they were willing
to impose federal liability, might be less likely to take the alternative of estab-
lishing blanket rules revolving around the intangible factor of national
interest; they might choose instead to allocate liability on the basis of the
more conventional but less workable private law analogies discussed above.
Technical considerations, rather than the policy questions concerning finan-
cial burdens, would largely exhaust the efforts of the courts if they chose
this alternative.
V. POLICY CONSEDERATIONS
Mr. Justice Black argues that retention of state or local liability tends to
thwart the national purpose envisioned by Congress in making federal
funds available for public improvements. This results because the financial
38. 23 U.S.C. § 103 (1964).
39. See Eden Memorial Park Ass'n v. Department of Pub. Works, 59 Cal. 2d 412,
417-18, 380 P.2d 390, 393, 29 Cal. Rptr. 790, 793 (1963).
40. It would be impossible, however, to allocate liability on a totally mechanical basis.
For example, suppose that land is located near the intersection of two highway improve-
ments, one a section of the Interstate System and the other classified as part of the
"primary" system of federal-ald highways. Suppose further that the land is damaged as
the result of construction of an approach from the "primary" highway to an overpass to
serve the intersection. The damage therefore resulted from construction on the "primary"
and not the Interstate section. A court faced with such a situation should have rules
flexible enough to allow an assertion that the whole area of the intersection was affected
by a national interest in uninterrupted traffic on the Interstate section, which interest
would support federal liability.
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burden of landowners' recoveries detracts from the set of self-interests a
state or locality can serve, and therefore dulls the inducement to partici-
pate in a federal-aid program.4 Another consideration is that landowners'
recoveries-at least those based on inverse condemnation sounding in
eminent domain, as opposed to tort-are susceptible of being called part
of the total cost of a project."2
A makeshift answer to these considerations presently exists in the policy
of the Bureau of Public Roads to reimburse states in part for landowners'
recoveries." Basically, the Bureau reimburses in the same ratio it has
agreed to pay toward the total cost of a highway project. However, this de-
vice for shifting the financial burden to the federal government presents
complex administrative difficulties which would be avoided if the federal
government were amenable to suit in the first instance. First, the land-
owners are compensated through a two-step process, in which the prob-
lems--among others-of accounting involve a waste of the efforts of admin-
istrative personnel. Second, problems arise because comity dictates that the
Bureau follow the general policy of accepting the state court's character-
ization of the nature of recoveries against the states. "The problem is that
lines between tort and inverse have been difficult to draw, and while some
overlap might provide a needed flexibility in state substantive law, it pre-
sents serious reimbursement problems to the Bureau of Public Roads.""4
Much time must be spent by federal personnel in reviewing the state char-
acterization of recovery to determine whether it is compensable as a project
cost.
Moreover, federal officials are naturally reluctant to reimburse states for
recoveries had under state law doctrine which they consider to be unusual
41. Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 94 (1962) (dissenting opinion), dis-
cussed in text accompanying note 20 supra.
42. MANDELKER, Op. cit. supra note 34, at 45. The present distinction drawn by state
courts between tort and theories such as inverse condemnation sounding in eminent
domain is quite fuzzy, due to the fact that "the trend is toward a coalescence of these two
doctrines." Id. at 44. But the distinction is helpful, at least between extreme cases on
either side of the distinction, to indicate whether a recovery should be considered part of
the project cost. Recoveries based on negligent maintenance after completion of con-
struction and, possibly, those based on single negligent acts of construction which cause no
continuing circumstance which is damaging to land should be excluded; and the fact
that these cases are typically analyzed in terms of tort serves as one guideline for exclu-
sion. See id. at 13, 44-45.
43. Reimbursement has been authorized for consequential and severance damages "of
a type generally compensable in eminent domain . . . determined by [the Bureau of]
Public Roads to be generally reimbursable on federal-aid highway projects." U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Policy and Procedure Memorandum
21-4.1, Right-of-Way Procedures § 3b (Dec. 30, 1960).
44. MANDELKER, op. cit. supra note 34, at 45.
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or unsound.45 The same is true of recoveries, in local courts suspected to
be unduly liberal toward the claims of landowners within that locality,
which have been affirmed by state appellate courts in their normal defer-
ence toward trial court findings. Inevitably, however, the flow of federal
reimbursing funds into the states is uneven, because total landowner
recoveries vary according to the manner in which each state handles in-
verse condemnation actions.
If the states were relieved of liability and landowners forced to proceed
directly against the federal government, they would presumably do so
under the Tucker Act46 which would bring them either into the federal dis-
trict courts or the Court of Claims.47 These federal tribunals would em-
ploy, more or less uniformly throughout the United States, the federal law
45. The Bureau has developed independent criteria for reimbursement of recoveries
for loss of access. U.S. Department of Commerce, supra note 43, at § 6k (amend. 3, Oct.
17, 1963). The development of such independent criteria is an exception to the general
policy of following state courts' characterization of the recovery. These exceptions
often are the source of friction between the Bureau and the states, as indicated by a pro-
test memorandum prepared by the Assistant Attorney General of Georgia in regard to
some amendments to the Bureau's reimbursement format:
The above amendments of PPM 21-4.1 are believed to be objectionable for the
following reasons:
A. The first of the proposed amendments... is believed to represent an attempt
by the Bureau to find some means by which it may refuse to participate in a jury
verdict rendered in a condemnation suit even though such verdict may be valid
and fair in all respects and rendered in full accord with prevailing State law. The
manner by which the Bureau seeks to do this is by enumerating certain elements of
damage or value which it says are 'not eligible for Federal participation', not
under any particular Federal law but under its own policy pronouncements....
This appears to be an indirect attempt to make uniform the laws of the 50 States
regarding eminent domain compensation so far as the Bureau is concerned. In
these respects it appears that the Bureau has exceeded its authority as an adminis-
trative agency and has, in effect, resorted to legislating rather than rule-making.
FEDERAL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND POLICY MEMORANDA PERTAINING To FEDERAL
PARTICIPATION IN RIGHT-OF-WAY ACQUISITION AND PROPERTY DAMAGE COSTS IN-
CURRED BY STATES ON FEDERAL-Am ROAD PROJECTS at 14, memorandum by
Richard L. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General and Special Attorney to Georgia
State Highway Department, presented at the Annual Convention of American As-
sociation of State Highway Offcials, Atlanta, Ga., Dec. 10, 1964.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1964). The act provides that claims founded upon the
United States Constitution or upon express or implied-in-fact contracts may be brought
against the United States in the federal district courts or in the Court of Claims. Note,
1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 210, 242 states that uncompensated landowners typically bring
their actions against the federal government under this act, although the federal courts
do not uniformly indicate which of the two allowable bases for suit under that act are
utilized in these actions.
47. The act does not expressly provide for a suit against the United States to be
brought in state court, and suits "are allowed only in the designated forum and only to
the extent that the United States has consented to be sued." United States v. Carey
Terminal Corp., 209 F. Supp. 385, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); see Fleming, The Federal
Government as an Adversary, 9 PRAc. LAw., DEC. 1963, p. 21, at 22-23.
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of inverse condemnation."' In short, the flow of federal funds to meet
this financial burden would be considerably evened.
What about policy considerations from the viewpoint of the landowner?
In many states the uncompensated landowner is restricted to remedies such
as mandamus or conditional injunction which only indirectly fetch him a
monetary premium.49 Or the owner may be required to put his claim
through time-consuming and expensive administrative channels as a con-
dition to maintaining a suit against the state."0 Plaintiffs whose compensa-
tion for the most part comes from the federal government would be able
to hurdle these occasional state procedural difficulties and proceed directly
against the primary source of highway funds. It is therefore probable that
if inverse condemnation actions were adjudicated within the uniform pro-
cedural framework of the federal system and according to one body of sub-
stantive law, liabilities on the Interstate System would be more uniformly
handled under a common body of substantive and procedural law which is
less burdensome to plaintiffs and which would dispose of litigation more
efficiently.
48. State law is normally disregarded in cases under the Tucker Act. Fleming,
supra note 47, at 23. Admittedly, the federal law of inverse condemnation is somewhat
illiberal toward landowners' recoveries and would probably have to undergo considerable
conceptual adjustments to enable it to accommodate the vast number of highway cases
that would be channeled into federal courts. See MANDELKER, Op. cit. supra note 34, at
19-20. "Federal law has arisen primarily out of riverbank improvements, and so it reflects
factual patterns not typical of the highway cases." Id. at 19. However, the opportunity for
development of a body of uniform law in federal tribunals is a promising alternative to
the present, rather chaotic, state of the law as it has emerged in the several state courts.
49. The development in inverse condemnation procedures has been left to the
vagaries of judicial development in 50 jurisdictions. The result is a complex
body of doctrine difficult to survey except in the most incremental fashion....
A first glance at the constitutional basis of inverse law is an invitation to
mistaken expectations. Constitutional provisions in all states either explicitly
guarantee or have been construed to guarantee that compensation will be paid
for property taken for public uses. However, only twenty of fifty states take
the simplest and most direct route and permit the aggrieved landowner to file
a common law action for inverse damages. The rest employ a variety of more
or less complicated procedures: a special statutory procedure, a writ of manda-
mus to compel the institution of condemnation proceedings, or a qualified
injunction to restrain the public agency pending the institution of proceedings
to pay compensation. Id. at 32. (Footnotes omitted.)
50. Professor Mandelker's survey of procedures in 50 states revealed that California
has a system which is most rigid in this regard. Id. at 39.
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